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Abstract 
This paper argues that an increase in the inequality of wealth prompts a stronger quest for 
status that in turn fosters the accumulation of wealth. It proposes a measure for an 
individual’s want of social status. For a given level of a population’s wealth, the 
corresponding aggregate measure of want of social status is shown to be positively related 
to the Gini coefficient of wealth inequality. Hence the Gini coefficient and growth are 
positively correlated, holding the population’s wealth constant. 
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 The relationship between inequality in the distribution of wealth and growth is not 
akin to the causal direct links between technological advancement and growth, or between 
per worker capital and growth.  Thus, there is an understandable need to identify an 
intervening variable and lay out the associated chain of interactions.  This demand has 
recently been met by several creative suppliers.  Zweimüller (2000) introduces the incentive 
to innovate and the demand for innovation as the intervening variable between wealth 
inequality and growth.  With a hierarchy of wants and wealth concentrated in the hands of a 
small group of wealthy people, only the members of this group buy the product of the most 
recent innovator.  Consequently, the market for his product is small.  A redistribution from 
the wealthy to the poor that would leave the wealthy rich enough to continue buying the 
product but at the same time enable the poor to buy the product would facilitate a faster 
increase in the size of the market for the product, increase the profitability of innovations, and 
foster growth.  To Fishman and Simhon (2002) the intervening variable of choice is the 
division of labor.  When increased specialization requires the investment of real resources, 
borrowing is constrained and capital markets are incomplete, individuals who command little 
wealth may not be able to invest in specialization.  Hence, economies with a highly unequal 
distribution of wealth may not be able to achieve a division of labor that is conducive to 
growth.  Perhaps the most intriguing of the recent forays is that of Corneo and Jeanne (2001) 
who single out the quest for social status as the intervening variable between wealth 
inequality and growth.  Succinctly put, their argument is as follows: “By increasing the 
dispersion of wealth levels, more inequality discourages those who are relatively poor from 
catching up with the rich in the contest for social status.  In turn, this weakens the incentives 
for the relatively rich to accumulate wealth in order to defend their social status.  As a 
consequence, the status motive inducing people to accumulate wealth is weaker for everyone 
under a more unequal distribution of wealth.  The resulting rate at which aggregate wealth is 
accumulated is therefore slower” (p. 284).  The purpose of this paper is to suggest an 
appealing and alternative measure of social status and to show that the incorporation of this 
measure might give rise to an outcome that is the opposite of the result eloquently derived by 
Corneo and Jeanne. 
 
 Corneo and Jeanne’s measure of the social status of individual i, whose wealth is  
is the fraction of those whose wealth is less than or equal to the wealth of i.  If F is the 
continuous cumulative distribution function of wealth, then, according to Corneo and Jeanne, 
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i’s rank in the wealth distribution is given by F   The intensity of the incentive of i to 
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 Consider a population that consists of two individuals whose wealth levels are 
 and   In this population, no individual should be expected to act in any 
way to improve his social status because each and every individual enjoys the highest 
possible social status: 1
.1002 =w
.   0)( iwF i ∀=−   Suppose, alternatively, that the wealth levels are  
and While individual 2 has the highest possible social status and, as 
before, should not be expected to act in any way to improve his status, individual 1, with 
.1012 =w
,
2002 =w
2
1   can secure a status gain if his level of wealth rises to 101.  The population-
wide incentive to accumulate wealth is higher when the wealth distribution is unequal (100, 
101) than when it is equal (100, 100).  Consider next a third configuration of incomes: 
 and   While the rank measure 1. )( iwF−  remains unchanged 
,0)2 
=(1  ,
2
1 − wF=  it is utterly unlikely that individual 1 will be indifferent 
between having 100 in a (100, 200) population and having 100 in a (100, 101) population. 
 
 The first tentative conclusion is that the crude rank measure 1  is not 
sufficiently sensitive to all the rank-related information.  A properly sensitive measure can be 
obtained when the proportion of individuals who are wealthier than the individual whose 
wealth is w  is weighted (multiplied) by the mean excess wealth of these 
individuals,  such that a given proportion of wealthier individuals who are 
little wealthier will confer a weaker sense of social status deprivation, SSD, than the same 
given proportion of wealthier individuals who are a great deal wealthier.
)iw
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1 Indeed, since for 
any finite w, −≠−− FdxxFxEwF 1)](1[()]( 2  the revised 
elaborate measure of “want of social status” will be adversely affected not only by a rise in 
                            
1 This measure is extricated from a large body of work by social psychologists, especially Runciman (1966). 
Based on that work, a set of axioms was formulated and several propositions were stated and proved, yielding 
the exhibited formula of SSD. For a detailed exposition see Stark (1993).  
2 The proof is in Appendix 1. 
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the share of individuals in the population who are wealthier than the reference individual (the 
individual whose wealth is w), but also by a rise in the level of wealth of any of these 
individuals. 
 
 Given the elaborate measure of lack of social status, SSD, do individuals who are – in 
terms of this measure – more deprived, more strongly inclined to exert effort in order to 
accumulate wealth?  A comparison of 100 with 200 brings about greater dismay than a 
comparison of 100 with 101, which in turn invites and induces a greater effort to reduce the 
associated social status deprivation.  On the other hand, 100 compared to 101 requires a 
smaller effort to erase the felt social deprivation than 100 compared to 200, perhaps rendering 
the exertion of the requisite effort more likely.  Corneo and Jeanne are of the opinion that it is 
more likely that effort will be spent in the (100, 101) case than in the (100, 200) case, which 
prompts them to conjecture that increased inequality is detrimental to wealth accumulation.  
Yet, as long as the set of the two individuals constitutes the reference group for each of the 
two individuals, effort exertion will increase in the level of social status deprivation of the 
lower-wealth individual. Given the tension between two perspectives that are logically 
appealing yet competing, consulting evidence that bears on the issue could be of help.  Three 
pieces of evidence come readily to mind.  They originate in a study of migration in response 
to relative deprivation, in a case study of the effort exerted by Japanese fishermen, and in an 
analysis of the structure of performance incentives in career games and other contests.  As it 
turns out, these three studies suggest that effort is rising in the level of status deprivation 
rather than declining.  
 
 A study of the migration response to relative deprivation by Mexican households, 
where relative deprivation is measured exactly as SSD except that income replaces wealth, 
reveals that when “absolute income is controlled for, relatively deprived households are more 
likely to engage in international migration than are households more favourably situated in 
their village’s income distribution.” (Stark, 1993, p. 160).  The evidence is not that 
households that are more relatively deprived are more likely to migrate. Rather, the more 
relatively deprived households are more likely to have a household member migrating while 
the household itself remains at the village of origin which, in turn, continues to constitute the 
household’s reference group. The purpose of migration from a household is to reduce the 
relative deprivation sensed by the household at origin. A comparison of three groups of 
Japanese fishermen (Gaspart and Seki, 2003) suggests that a larger within-groups 
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heterogeneity (in terms of fish-catching performance) results in the lower-performing 
members of the group exerting more fishing effort.  An analysis of the pay structure in 
corporations and of the prize structure in sport tournaments suggests that in order to preserve 
performance incentives, rewards are raised as rungs are stepped up.  Stark (1990, p. 216) 
argues that “the intensity of effort to move up depends positively on how much relative 
deprivation there is to be gotten rid of.  As one climbs the ladder, the proportion of those 
whose rank is higher declines.  To counter the erosion of relative deprivation, it is therefore 
necessary to increase the second term; that is, the mean excess income, hence top prizes, 
must increase.” Stark shows that the salary structure of executives, the variation across salary 
structures, the structure of prize money by rank in golf tournaments, as well as other 
architectures of pay and rewards, share the feature of “elevating the top prizes [so as to 
lengthen] the ladder for higher-ranking contestants” (Rosen 1986, p. 713). That higher-ranked 
positions are rewarded by a higher pay because such positions entail rising levels of 
responsibility is not the issue. Rather, the question that the analysis has sought to address is 
why is it that the payment increments rise as one climbs the ladder.  
 
 It is possible to sum up the individual wants of social status in order to obtain an 
aggregate measure of the population-wide want of social status, TSSD.  It is further possible 
to show that this measure is positively related to the Gini coefficient of inequality of the 
distribution of wealth, G.3  Specifically, it is shown in Appendix 2 that  , 
where w
TSSDGw
n
i
i =⋅

∑=1
i is the level of wealth of i, i=1,…, n. We next present an example that illustrates our 
main idea in a setting in which there are three (rather than two) individuals, and wherein the 
total level of wealth is held constant. Consider the following three configurations of income: 
 
P1 = ( 1/10 , 45/100 , 45/100 ); 
P2 = ( 1/10 , 4/10 , 5/10 ); 
P3 = ( 1/10 , 3/10 , 6/10 ). 
 
Since  , we have that G=TSSD= ∑
=
=
3
1
1
i
iw iP∀ 7/30 for P1; G=TSSD= 8/30 for P2; and 
G=TSSD= 10/30 for P3. In all three configurations, the individual with wealth 1/10 is equally 
                                                          
3  The derivations are in Appendix 2. 
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relatively deprived and hence will exert the same level of effort. But the Gini coefficient is 
not equal across all configurations. As constructed, there is a higher Gini coefficient in P3 
than in P2 and, indeed, a higher relative deprivation for the second individual in P3 than in 
P2 – hence a stronger inclination by him to exert effort. Thus, we infer that a higher Gini 
coefficient is associated with a stronger inclination to exert effort in order to accumulate 
wealth for the population as a whole, even though the higher TSSD does not arise from a 
higher SSD for all the individuals concerned. Since a higher TSSD reflects a stronger 
intensity of the motive to accumulate wealth for a given level of a population’s wealth, it 
follows that the Gini coefficient and growth will be positively correlated, holding the 
population’s wealth constant.  Corneo and Jeanne point to a negative correlation.  Presumably 
further reflection and additional study of how the preference for improved social status and 
economic growth interact are warranted. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 We provide a proof that social status deprivation, SSD, can be written either as 
 or as [ ][∫
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In order to show that  lim[ ] 0 )(1 =−∞→ xxFx , we note that  
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where the last inequality is Chebyshev’s inequality. Upon multiplying the end sides by x and 
taking limits we obtain that for a finite variance:  
 
[ ] .0lim)(1lim0 =≤−≤ ∞→∞→ x
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Appendix 2 
 
 We provide a proof that the aggregate, population-wide want of social status, TSSD, 
is equal to the population’s wealth times the Gini coefficient of inequality of the distribution 
of wealth.  We refer to the discrete case. 
 
 Let the levels of wealth of the n individuals who constitute the population be ordered: 
 
 
}....{ 21 nwwwW ≤≤≤=  
 
Define the want of social status of an individual whose wealth level is 
as   1 ..., 2, ,1  , −= niwi
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where it is understood that .0)( =nwSSD  
 
Therefore, the aggregate want of social status is 
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The Gini coefficient is defined as 
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When the wealth levels are 100 and 101, 
402
1=G  and 
2
1=TSSD , whereas when the wealth 
levels are 100 and 200, 
6
1=G  and .50=TSSD  A higher G is associated with a higher TSSD. 
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